Wed & Friday:

Riddles, Ch. 2 on Fate

Writing assignment on this chapter, due Friday.

See this: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fatalism/

Fatalism

First published Wed Dec 18, 2002; substantive revision Tue Oct 10, 2006

Fatalism is the view that we are powerless to do anything other than what we actually do. It may be argued for in various ways: by appeal to logical laws and metaphysical necessities; by appeal to the existence and nature of God; by appeal to causal determinism. When argued for in the first way, it is commonly called "Logical fatalism" (or, in some cases, "Metaphysical fatalism"); when argued for in the second way, it is commonly called "Theological fatalism". When argued for in the third way it is not now commonly referred to as "fatalism" at all, and such arguments will not be discussed here.

The interest in arguments for fatalism lies at least as much in the question of how the conclusion may be avoided as in the question of whether it is true.

• 1. Logical Fatalism: Aristotle's argument and the nature of truth
  • 1.1 Aristotle's solution
  • 1.2 Related solutions
  • 1.3 Rejection of the theory of truth
• 2. Logical fatalism: Diodorus Cronus and the necessity of the past
  • 2.1 An Aristotelian solution
  • 2.2 An Ockhamist solution
• 3. Logical fatalism: Richard Taylor's argument and the conditions of power
  • 3.1 An Aristotelian solution
  • 3.2 The conditions of power
• 4. The necessity of the past and Aristotelian solutions
• 5. Theological Fatalism: Pike's argument and God's omniscience
  • 5.1 An Aristotelian solution
  • 5.2 An Ockhamist solution
  • 5.3 Affecting the past
  • 5.4 A Boethian solution
  • 5.5 The nature of God's knowledge
  • 5.6 Must God be omniscient?
• 6. Theological Fatalism: Molina, Plantinga and middle knowledge
• 7. The Idle Argument
• 8. Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries