Morehouse Metaphysics

2010-12-01T05:32:00.001-08:00

FYI the final exam schedule is here:
http://tigernet.morehouse.edu/TigerPages/Fall2010FinalExamSchedule.pdf

2010-11-18T06:43:00.000-08:00

Friday we will finish the chapter on beginning of life issues in Shoemaker, picking up where we left off Wed. Thanks!

2010-11-10T13:26:00.001-08:00

As mentioned in class today, there is no class with Dr. Nobis this Friday. See your blogs and email for the assignments you should be working on, and for what we'll do Monday. Thanks.

2010-11-10T06:26:00.001-08:00

Metaphysics writing assignment

Due Monday, Nov. 15 in class

No class Friday: work on this writing assignment

On p. 60 of "Personal Identity and Ethics, David Shoemaker writes this:

"In the previous chapter, we examined four such theories [of identity, that arguably grounds rational anticipation and self-concern] -- Soul, Software-Based Memory, Brain (Hardware)-Based Memory, and Body Criteria -- but saw that they were either false, seriously problematic, or just irrelevant to the issue of our practical concerns."

You assignment is to fully explain his complex claim here -- all aspects of it -- and explain whether you think what he says is true or false and why.

This will likely take at least a few pages, since each theory will need to be explained and the criticisms against it explained.

2010-11-09T10:02:00.001-08:00

As was mentioned in class, for Wed. please have an outline of Chapters 2 and 3 of Shoemaker. We will use them to discuss the chapters. Thanks

2010-10-20T10:03:00.001-07:00

For Friday we are moving on to the Introduction to the Personal Identity and Ethics book

Notes

2010-10-12T11:02:00.001-07:00

Here are some of the notes I have handed out:

Ch. 1:
http://morehousemetaphysics.blogspot.com/2007/08/notes-on-riddles-of-existence-ch.html

Ch. 2:
http://morehousemetaphysics.blogspot.com/2007/09/arguments-on-fatalism-riddles-ch.html

Ch. 3:
http://morehousemetaphysics.blogspot.com/2007/09/notes-on-riddles-of-existence-ch.html

Study Guide

2010-10-12T10:58:00.001-07:00

Study Guide

As we discussed in class Friday, here is information on the midterm in class exam, this Friday.

We discussed these topics in class and have had readings on them:

Personal Identity
Fatalism
Time
Free Will

Your midterm will ask you to demonstrate that you understand these issues -- and what motivates the issues -- and the relevant positions and arguments for and against the various positions (typically, at least one argument). And you will be asked to state a tentative position or view of your own on the topics. You will be asked to write your responses in manner that someone not in this class would understand (a) what the the issues, topics or problems are, (b) what the responses to the issues, topics or problems are, i.e., what the main positions are, (c) some arguments for and/or against various positions and (d) your tentative estimate of which views are correct and why.

2010-09-18T10:34:00.001-07:00

Monday: fatalism chapter concluded
Wed: chapter on Time.

Recall the writing assignments on each reading/chapter!

next week

2010-09-10T11:17:00.001-07:00

For Monday, read and write a detailed summary of Riddles, Ch. 1 on personal identity. We will only discuss that chapter Monday.

For Wed., read and write a detailed summary of Riddles, Ch. 1 on Fatalism. We will discuss the arguments of that chapter Wed. and Friday.

Wed. & Friday

2010-08-30T07:58:00.000-07:00

Today we read part of this on abortion, which mentions a personal identity related argument.

For Wed. we will read the First Night of the Perry book. Friday, 2nd Night.

For Friday and Monday, next week

2010-08-26T12:56:00.000-07:00

There is no class Friday; instructor is out of town for a conference.
Please sign up for the email group; the link is on the syllabus.
Please get the books and start reading!

For Monday, please read the "First Night" of the Perry book and write a summary.
For Wednesday, please read the "Second Night" of the Perry book and write a summary.
For Friday, please read the "Third Night" of the Perry book and write a summary.

On the first day of class, we discussed this survey:

Philosophical survey

We are students at Carleton College, doing research on people's responses to philosophical questions. By participating in our experiment, you will be helping us learn more about how these responses vary across the population. We would appreciate if you could help us by filling out this anonymous and confidential survey. It will take about 5-10 minutes. These questions might seem unusual to you. Please take some time to read and think through them. Be aware, however, that there is no right answer to any of the questions below.

1. Suppose your rich uncle has just passed away. He had no other family and left you his inheritance. Also imagine that you have brown hair. Your friend, Alex, has blonde hair. Suppose that a new technique has been developed that allows for successful full-brain transplants. Imagine this technique is employed to transplant your brain into the body of your friend, Alex. Alex’s brain is put into your body. What should be done with the inheritance? On a scale of one to five, please mark how strongly you agree with each of the following statements. (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)

1 2 3 4 5

It should be given to the person with brown hair.

It should be given to the person with blonde hair.

It should be given to neither.

It should be split between the two.

2. Suppose there exists a technology that transplants the information contained in the brain. The technology is used to swap the information – memories, personality, emotions – in your brain with the information in Alex’s. What should be done with the inheritance from your uncle? On a scale of one to five, please mark how strongly you agree with each of the following statements (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). Remember, you started off with brown hair and Alex started off with blonde hair.

1 2 3 4 5

It should be given to the person with brown hair.

It should be given to the person with blonde hair.

It should be given to neither.

It should be split between the two.

3. Suppose the scientific community discovers the existence of a non-physical thing that is unique to each person. Some people might call this a ‘soul.’ A third piece of technology is discovered that can transplant this ‘soul.’ The technology is used to switch your ‘soul’ with Alex’s. What should be done with the inheritance from your uncle? On a scale of one to five, please mark how strongly you agree with each of the following statements (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). Remember, you started off with brown hair and Alex started off with blonde hair.

1 2 3 4 5

It should be given to the person with brown hair.

It should be given to the person with blonde hair.

It should be given to neither.

It should be split between the two.

4. Suppose that a teleportation device is invented. The device is designed to destroy your body here on Earth and at the same time put together a new body, identical to the original, on a space station. You decide to try it out, but the device malfunctions – it fails to destroy your original body. Now there are two identical bodies, one here on Earth and one on the space station. What should be done with the inheritance from your uncle? On a scale of one to five, please mark how strongly you agree with each of the following statements (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree).

1 2 3 4 5

It should be given to the person on Earth.

It should be given to the person on the space station.

It should be given to neither.

It should be split between the two.

2010-08-25T11:42:00.001-07:00

Metaphysics Syllabus, Fall 2010

Course: Metaphysics - 48775 - HPHI 475B - 01

Web page: http://MorehouseMetaphysics.blogspot.com

Email group that students must sign up for: http://groups.google.com/group/morehouse-metaphysics
Day, Time and Place: MWF, 10-10:50; Sale 110

Instructor: Dr. Nathan Nobis; nathan.nobis@gmail.com ; www.NathanNobis.com

Office: Philosophy & Religion Department, Sale Hall 113

Office Hours: 9:30-9:45 AM MWF, 2-3 MWF and by appointment

COURSE DESCRIPTION:

This is a course on issues in contemporary analytic metaphysics. An upper-level course, Metaphysics is designed for students who have already taken philosophy courses and are familiar with philosophical methodology (e.g., deductive and inductive argumentation, conceptual analysis, and theory assessment using counterexample).

Metaphysics is central to philosophy, since almost all philosophical views presuppose some metaphysical claims. Although it is difficult to state precisely the subject matter of metaphysics, mainstream academic metaphysicians seek reasoned answers to our most fundamental questions about reality that seem unanswerable by scientific methods. Because these questions are so basic, metaphysics is about as abstract as thinking gets. Metaphysical questions include these:

Why does anything exist?
Does God exist?
Can two different objects share, or exist at, the same location?
Is there anything more to a human person than the brain and nervous system?
What makes me the same person now that I was when I was younger? How is that you are the same individual you were last week, or when you were 10 (or 5, or 1, or birth, or before..?), given all the changes that have occurred to you? What makes a person the same person over time, despite such drastic changes?
It seems that everything that happens has a cause (whether we know what it is or not). But if everything is caused, and so our actions are caused, can we have free will? What is it have free will?
What is time like? Could we travel through time?
Are there any general properties, sharable by more than one thing at a single time, or are there only particular things?

We will discuss these topics (and other metaphysical issues), but our greatest emphasis will be on metaphysical questions concerning (1) personal identity and (2) free will and moral responsibility.

Our primary tasks will be to set up each issue carefully, to consider arguments for some leading views with respect to each issue, and to assess those arguments and views by considering objections to them. Although we will often gain clarity about the strengths and weaknesses of various arguments and theories, we will rarely find any substantive metaphysical view to be established. The difficulty of establishing answers to metaphysical questions is due largely to the fact that plausible answers almost always conflict with some intuitive, common-sense view. Nevertheless, the serious and thoughtful student will be rewarded with an understanding of the assets and liabilities of various metaphysical views.

REQUIRED MATERIALS:

1. Riddles of Existence by Ted Sider and Earl Conee (Oxford). The first chapter is available here: http://tedsider.org/books/personal_identity.pdf

2. A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality by John Perry (Hackett)

3. Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction, by David Shoemaker (Broadview)

4. A number of articles from philosophical journals online that must be downloaded, printed and brought to class. Links will be provided by the blog and the email group.

LEARNING OUTCOMES:

State and explain some leading metaphysical theories and arguments.
Illustrate the assets and liabilities of some leading metaphysical theories and arguments.
Evaluate the plausibility of some leading metaphysical theories and arguments.
Write a thoughtful, concise argumentative paper that exhibits the rhetorical and explanatory standards of contemporary analytic philosophy.

GRADING:

*Writings About the Readings: Summaries, Outlines, Presentations, Identifying the Arguments writings, Discussion Questions: a variety of written assignments to help encourage that students do the reading and be prepared for discussion of the readings, by any means necessary. These written assignments will be at least once a week, often twice, and will not be accepted late. Students who do not have their homework might not be allowed to participate in class, will be asked to leave and that day will count as an absence (see below). Reading* and class preparation is important!!	40% of total grade.
*Midterm Exam* – during regular midterm exam time. Study questions will be provided.	20% of total grade
*Final Paper* and presentation of paper to class: an ideal paper will involve finding an article mentioned, but not discussed in detail, in the readings and writing a paper where the argument is summarized and critically responded to. Approximately 8 pages or 2000-2500 words.	20% of total grade
Participation (presentations; leading discussion, commentary presented on another students’ paper)	20% of total grade
Attendance and Punctuality	Variable; see below

ATTENDANCE REGULATIONS:

Class attendance is required for all Morehouse College courses. Each student is allowed four absences in this course. In addition, two latenesses will count as one absence. Students who are late are responsible for informing the instructor at the end of the class period that they are present, otherwise they may be recorded as absent. Excuses for absences should be submitted no later than two weeks from occurrence. Students who accumulate more than four officially unexcused absences may have their course grade lowered. Daily attendance will be recorded. Each student should keep a record of his or her absences. Students who miss exams or quizzes due to unexcused absences will not be allowed to make them up. Students who fail to submit any written work on the due dates, without official excuse, may be penalized. Students who take a trip that is officially sponsored (and therefore excused) by the College must inform the instructor prior to the trip to discuss how their class work can be made up. Students should make a point of informing the instructor of any required special accommodation.

Accommodation for Students with Disabilities: In accordance with Title 5, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Acts of 1990, reasonable accommodation will be provided to any student who has followed Morehouse College procedures. To begin the process, please contact The Learning Center at the beginning of the semester. Once the need for accommodations has been officially established, the student should consult with the instructor to insure that the student’s needs may be met as effectively as possible.

SCHEDULE

The tentative order of readings is below, although some chapters in the Riddles book might be skipped. The exact schedule of readings will be announced in class; our rate of progress depends on the nature of our discussions.

Additional materials and assignments will be announced or given out in class. Since this class will be conducted in seminar style using the Socratic Method, discussion, workshops and student presentations, specific reading assignment dates will be adjusted throughout the semester to allow for discussion of issues that may take more class time. If you have any questions about your reading assignment, please do not hesitate to ask the instructor for clarification. Please bring your books to class since we will read important passages together and sometimes read selections that were not included in that day’s assignment.

A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality, by John Perry (Hackett)

We will read and discuss this short book the 2^nd week of class.

RIDDLES: CH 1 PERSONAL IDENTITY

RIDDLES: CH. 2: FATALISM

RIDDLES: CH. 3: TIME

We will omit the Riddles chapter on God. Interested students are encouraged to read it and take Philosophy of Religion.

RIDDLES: CH. 5: WHY NOT NOTHING?

RIDDLES: CH. 6: FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM

We will also read a number of philosophical journal articles on the topics of free will, moral responsibility and determinism.

RIDDLES CH. 7: CONSTITUTION

RIDDLES CH. 8. UNIVERSALS

RIDDLES CH. 9. POSSIBILITY AND NECESSITY

RIDDLES CH. 10. WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?

Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction, by David Shoemaker (Broadview)

Introduction
Part A: Personal Identity and Self-Regarding Ethics
Chapter One: Personal Identity and Immortality
Chapter Two: Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern
Chapter Three: Alternative Approaches

Part B: Personal Identity and Other-Regarding Ethics
Chapter Four: Moral Issues at the Beginning of Life, Part I: Killing
Chapter Five: Moral Issues at the Beginning of Life, Part II: Creation
Chapter Six: Moral Issues at the End of Life
Chapter Seven: Personal Identity and Moral Responsibility
Chapter Eight: Personal Identity and Ethical Theory

Conclusion: Notes on Method

Note: A syllabus is not a contract, but rather a guide to course procedures. The instructor reserves the right to alter the course requirements and/or assignments based on new materials, class discussions, or other legitimate pedagogical objectives.

Reworking metaphysics papers for conference submission

2008-01-03T09:08:00.000-08:00

Some of you have contacted me about this, but here are some general suggestions for revising your papers for submission to this local conference below.

1. Make sure your paper has a short (1/2 page or so) introduction leading to a thesis. THe introduction should say something like "In [paper's title], Joe Schmoe argues for [state his thesis, main point]. Then you might want to say a few things about how his argument is going to work and then state your thesis, which will likely be something like, "I will argue that his argument is unsound", then you might very briefly say why.

2. It can be helpful to have labeled sections. So then have a section where you present the person's argument. You might also need to present some background info. on the issue, which could go either here or, perhaps, in the intro.

3. Then have a section where you critique that exact argument.

4. Then have a section where you consider objections.

5. THen have a section where you conclude.

What's most important is that you see things from the position of your audience. They will likely know nothing of your particular issue/target paper, and likely little about the topic anyway, so you need to help them understand the issue in a way that they will be able to engage it, learn something, and have an enjoyable, thought-provoking discussion with you.

http://a-s.clayton.edu/ahall/philosophy/southeast_philosophy_conference.htm

SOUTHEAST PHILOSOPHY CONFERENCE AT CLAYTON STATE

UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH PRESENTATIONS

CLAYTON STATE UNIVERSITY

FEBRUARY 16, 2008

CALL FOR PAPERS

The inaugural meeting of the Southeast Philosophy Conference is scheduled for Saturday, February 16, 2008, at Clayton State University in Morrow, Georgia. Papers in any area are welcome. There will be a $15 registration fee, payable at the conference.

Submissions must not exceed a length of 3000 words, and must include a cover letter stating the paper’s title, author’s name, university or college, mailing and email addresses, and telephone number. Either email submissions to toddjanke@clayton.edu or send two printed copies to:

Southeast Philosophy Conference

Department of Communicative Arts & Integrative Studies

Clayton State University

Morrow, Georgia 30260

Papers must be received by January 28, 2008. Notification of acceptance will be made via email by February 4, 2008. Papers will be published in a Proceedings of the Conference, with a prize awarded for the best essay.

Contact for questions: toddjanke@clayton.edu

2007-11-19T12:11:00.000-08:00

For Monday after break:

Kane's views: Ch. 11 and 12

For Wed.:
Last chapter of Conee & Sider entitled "What is Metaphysics?"

2007-11-19T07:21:00.001-08:00

Metaphysics

Final Exam

Due: Wed. December 5, 10:30 AM

YOU MUST COME TO CLASS AND TURN IT IN AT THIS TIME.

YOUR FINAL PAPER IS ALSO DUE AT THIS TIME.

At least 5 pages, carefully written and flawlessly proofed

This exam presents an opportunity for you to show that you have a deep, comprehensive and nuanced understanding of free will problems and their complexity.

Write an essay where all these questions below are answered. Write for an audience that knows nothing about the free will problem: explain everything so they understand. Your essay should have an introduction.

For more guidance on writing, see the Pryor article handed out in class.

What is the best definition, concept or theory of what it is to act freely or have free will? To answer this, you must explain and discuss a specific definition, concept or theory (so not a broad category like “libertarian”; you need a specific version of a broad theory) and contrast it to two other specific definitions, concepts or theories. You need to argue that your favorite specific definition, concept or theory is the best. So you need to explain everything you need to do that so that your audience understands.

Is this theory compatible with determinism? If someone might think it is, explain why someone might think this. If they are mistaken in suspecting this, explain why they are mistaken.

Is this theory compatible with indeterminism? If someone might think it is, explain why someone might think this. If they are mistaken in suspecting this, explain why they are mistaken.

Thus, is your preferred theory of free will or free action compatiblistic or incompatiblistic?

In light of (1), (2) and (3) above, do we ever have such a free will, or act freely, on this understanding of free will, determinism and indeterminism?

What are two of the strongest objections to your position? How do you respond to these objections?

2007-11-14T07:26:00.000-08:00

For Friday: Ch. 8 Kane: Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities

Harry Frankfurt's views are discussed in this chapter and the next. Here's some on him:

====

http://press.princeton.edu/video/frankfurt/

On Bullshit

Harry G. Frankfurt

Book Description | Shopping Cart | Endorsements
Chapter 1 [HTML] or [PDF format]

Video interview with Harry G. Frankfurt

Clip 1. What brought you, as a professional philosopher, to write about bullshit? (1:41)

QuickTime: Dial-up | Broadband RealPlayer: Dial-up | Broadband WindowsMedia: Dial-up | Broadband

Clip 2. What is your theory of bullshit? What is bullshit? (:39)

QuickTime: Dial-up | Broadband RealPlayer: Dial-up | Broadband WindowsMedia: Dial-up | Broadband

Clip 3. Do you find bullshitters actually more reprehensible than liars? (1:01)

QuickTime: Dial-up | Broadband RealPlayer: Dial-up | Broadband WindowsMedia: Dial-up | Broadband

Clip 4. Is it difficult for you as a philosopher to deal with behavior so indifferent to your values? (1:14)

QuickTime: Dial-up | Broadband RealPlayer: Dial-up | Broadband WindowsMedia: Dial-up | Broadband

Clip 5. Does bullshit require a kind of creativity or imagination that simple falsehood doesn't? (1:00)

QuickTime: Dial-up | Broadband RealPlayer: Dial-up | Broadband WindowsMedia: Dial-up | Broadband

Clip 6. Is there more bullshit today than, say, 100 years ago, or ever before? (1:10)

QuickTime: Dial-up | Broadband RealPlayer: Dial-up | Broadband WindowsMedia: Dial-up | Broadband

Clip 7. Are more highly educated people more likely to engage in bullshit? (:52)

QuickTime: Dial-up | Broadband RealPlayer: Dial-up | Broadband WindowsMedia: Dial-up | Broadband

Clip 8. Can you give us any salient examples of bullshit today that we might be familiar with? (1:33)

QuickTime: Dial-up | Broadband RealPlayer: Dial-up | Broadband WindowsMedia: Dial-up | Broadband

Clip 9. Can anything be done about bullshit, or is it just a universal human tendency? (1:08)

QuickTime: Dial-up | Broadband RealPlayer: Dial-up | Broadband WindowsMedia: Dial-up | Broadband

Entire interview in one file (10:23)

QuickTime: Dial-up | Broadband RealPlayer: Dial-up | Broadband WindowsMedia: Dial-up | Broadband

Audio iPod (MP3) Dial-up Video iPod (MP4) Broadband

File created: 2/11/05

-------

Notes on Kane Ch. 7: Is Free Will Possible? Hard Determinists and Other Skeptics

Announcements:

Paper topics (and, ideally, “target” papers/writings) due Friday. See assignment sheet.
The Georgia Philosophical Society meeting is this Saturday at Georgia State. Want to go to part of it? See your email, the blog and/or talk to Dr. Nobis.
Some students never addressed the problems with their midterms from a long time ago. This will be a problem for these students.

Some cases of what seems to be serious wrongdoing (p. 69-70):

Oklahoma City bombing
Columbine killings
Far too many other cases … some of which might hit especially “close to home”

Question: did these people act freely? Were they morally responsible for what they did, i.e., they should be held morally accountable, punished, thought bad of, criticized, be used in classroom examples of (bad) people doing very bad things, etc.

Common answers? Common reasons that would be given for these answers?

1. No “external” coercion, force, manipulation, etc.

2. “Internal” factors – beliefs and desires – can be overcome [“ultimate,” “genuine” or “true” responsibility” made at crucial choices]

In short, “common sense” seems to presuppose the ability to do otherwise in exactly the same antecedent circumstances. Thus, it seems to presuppose some kind of libertarian / incompatiblist conception of free will.

But this kind of free will, some argue, is incompatible with determinism, but it is also hard to see how it is compatible with indeterminism (e.g., luck, randomness objections). Thus, perhaps this conception of free will is incoherent or an impossibility.

Reply to conditional analysis of “can”: “Yes, if they had chosen or wanted to not do these evils, then they would have not done them and they could have chosen or wanted to not do what they did.

Of interest: A principle: “‘Ought’ implies ‘can.’” If you ought to do X, then you can do X. So if you cannot do X, it is not the case that you ought to do X.

Strawson’s Argument to add fuel to the fire (p. 71-72)

Is hard determinism (FW & DET are incompatible and we don’t have FW) an acceptable position? Literally, can we (or anyone) even accept it? What, if anything, would be bad about accepting it? What would follow if it were true or if we believed it to be true about:

Our view on our own accomplishments? (p. 74)
Our view on punishment? (p. 75)

Two theories about punishment: (1) punishment is justified if, and when, it is deserved; (2) punishment is justified if, and when, it is has good consequences for the future (e.g., keeps the rest of us safer, deters future crime, rehabilitates people, etc.).

· Love and relationships (p. 76-77)

Similaksy: Common beliefs about free will and responsibility are an illusion.

Some responses: (1) defend a version of libertarianism from the randomness objections; (2) develop a better version of compatiblism that doesn’t rely on conditional analysis; (3) accept MYSTERY!!

2007-11-12T11:58:00.001-08:00

For Wed. please have carefully read Ch. 7 on hard determinism.

2007-11-10T05:22:00.000-08:00

Here are some philosophers to look at for target papers for your final paper; of course there are many more!:

Pereboom ( a hard determinist):
http://www.arts.cornell.edu/phil/homepages/pereboom/

O'Connor ( agent causation-ist):
http://php.indiana.edu/~toconnor/philosophical_essays.html

Saul Smilansky (a hard determinist)
http://philo.haifa.ac.il/faculty_pages/smilansk.htm

Tom Kapitan (a compatiblist, but of a kind we haven't seen):
http://www.niu.edu/phil/~kapitan/papers.shtml

Eddy Nahmias from Georgia State:
http://www2.gsu.edu/~wwwphl/philosophy/faculty/nahmias/index.html

And a blog on free will issues: http://gfp.typepad.com/

2007-11-02T08:27:00.001-07:00

for Monday, re-read Dennett in Reading Metaphysics; discussion questions are due.

For Wed., read Kane Ch. 4 on libertarianism, indeterminism and chance.

Bring your books to class. We read them in class, so you need to have them.

2007-10-31T07:18:00.001-07:00

For Friday, read Kane Ch. 2 on Compatiblism.
Also read Dennett on compatiblism in Reading Metaphysics. Discussion questions are due Monday.

If you'd like, do the discussion questions on van Inwagen also. And re-read Kane Ch. 3.

Start thinking about papers. I have much more to say about that, but the best plan is to do a "critical paper" on some article/chapter/ selection on some topic of interest. One ideal plan would be to find something by one of the authors discussed by Kane and critique their arguments/position. 3000 words, and you should consider submitting your paper to the local undergraduate philosophy conference in the spring. More later.

Another plan, of course, would be the same kind of thing on ANY of the topics we have covered (or will cover). I suspect arguments related to God's existence are another more accessible topic; some of the other topics are less easy to get into, I suspect.

2007-10-24T07:46:00.001-07:00

For Friday, re-read the Sider chapter.
And please read Chapter 1 of the Kane book. We are going to do a free will blowout. If you don't have the book, I put copies of the chapter in my box in my office.

Tomorrow there's a good talk at Emory:
10/25/07

"One Person Doesn't Make a Difference ," Stuart Rachels, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Alabama. 205 White Hall, 4:15pm. William Edwards Lecture

If you are interested in going, let me know.

Start thinking about papers. I have plans so you can do something that will be suitable for submitting to this local conference in Feb.:

SOUTHEAST PHILOSOPHY CONFERENCE AT CLAYTON STATE

UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH PRESENTATIONS

CLAYTON STATE UNIVERSITY

FEBRUARY 16, 2008

CALL FOR PAPERS

The inaugural meeting of the Southeast Philosophy Conference is scheduled for Saturday, February 16, 2008, at Clayton State University in Morrow, Georgia. Papers in any area are welcome. There will be a $15 registration fee, payable at the conference.

Submissions must not exceed a length of 3000 words, and must include a cover letter stating the paper's title, author's name, university or college, mailing and email addresses, and telephone number. Either email submissions to toddjanke@clayton.edu or send two printed copies to:

Southeast Philosophy Conference

Department of Communicative Arts & Integrative Studies

Clayton State University

Morrow, Georgia 30260

Papers must be received by January 28, 2008. Notification of acceptance will be made via email by February 4, 2008. Papers will be published in a Proceedings of the Conference.

2007-10-05T07:01:00.002-07:00

Metaphysics Take-Home Midterm

Due Friday, October 12. 2007 in class (not later in Dr. Nobis’s box, etc.)

Class Monday and Wednesday are optional:

come and discuss the questions and issues of the exam, if you’d like.

NO LATE PAPERS. LATE PAPER = 0

Read the materials on how to write a philosophy paper; see handout or blog.

Construct your answers so that someone who hasn’t read the material, has not ever discussed these issues, and is totally ignorant about them – but is very smart and is a careful and critical thinker – could understand your answers. That is, you must explain everything, give the relevant backstory, and provide everything else so that your reader is able to understand.

Response to all these writing prompts:

Describe two different kinds of logically possible “splitting” cases, i.e., where a persons’s mind and/or body (i.e., brain, typically) are divided. Explain the implications of these kinds of cases for what we should think about the issue of personal identity. In light of these cases, explain Parfit’s proposal that personal identity does not matter; rather, what matters is survival. Thus, explain which (broad) view about the nature of person identity we should accept. Defend your answers from objections.

Fully present and explain the strongest argument that you believe can be given in defense of fatalism (metaphysical or logical, or theological: you need to explain what fatalism is, of course). Explain whether this argument is sound or not and why and, thus, whether anyone should think that any kind of fatalism is true or not. Defend your answers from objections. \

Is time travel logically possible? Explain what time travel is. Explain why one might think that it is logically possible (or, at least, why there is no reason to think that it is not possible) or why it is logically impossible. Explain which theory (or theories) or conception of time on which time travel might be possible. Which theory of time is moral plausible, all things considered, including the question of time travel.

From an intellectual point of view, or a philosophical point of view, should people believe that God exists? To answer this question you must explain and critique at least two arguments for God’s existence (of course, you must also explain what is meant by ‘God’), and think about what role reasons and arguments should play for what people believe.

2007-10-05T07:01:00.001-07:00

Anselms' argument, simplified.

He assumes that we (even "fool" atheists) have the concept of God, i.e., the idea of "the being who none greater can be conceived" i.e., thought. (Question: do we have such a concept? Is the concept coherent? Is a being like this possible? Perhaps not: perhaps

Here's the argument, simplified.

1. Either (a) "the being whom none greater can be conceived" exists only as a concept or an idea or (b) "the being whom none greater can be conceived" exists both as a concept and in reality.
2. To exist in reality is greater than to exist only as a concept or an idea. [see Anselm, end of 2nd paragraph, p. 71 of handout; Stairs premise 2, p. 82]
3. If (2) is true and if (a), the claim that "the being whom none greater can be conceived" exists only as a concept or an idea is true, then there exists a being greater than "the being whom none greater can be conceived."
4. But there cannot be a being greater than "the being whom none greater can be conceived," because that's a contraction.
5. So, (a) is not an option.
6. So, (b) "the being whom none greater can be conceived" exists both as a concept and in reality.
7. So, God exists, the being whom none greater can be conceived.

The basic logic:
1. Either A or B.
2. If B is true, then C is true.
3. But C is not true (because C is contradictory)
4. So, not B. (2, 3 Modus Tollens)
5. So, A. (1, 4, Disjunctive Syllogism).

Here's the argument from the Descartes' Fifth Meditation with a modifed translation:

If I can clearly and distinctly think the idea of something, then everything which I clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to that thing really does belong to it. "Certainly, the idea of God, or a supremely perfect being, is one that I find within me just as surely as the idea of any shape or number. And my understanding that it belongs to his nature that he always exists is no less clear and distinct than is the case when I prove of any shape or number that some property belongs to its nature." (AT 7:65; CSM 2:45).

So here's the argument:
1. If we can clearly and distinctly think the idea of something, then everything which we clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to that thing really does belong to it.
2. We can clearly and distinctly perceive the idea of God, or a supremely perfect being.
3. We can clearly and distinctly perceive that he always exists.
4. Therefore, since (1), (2) and (3) are true, God exists.

Here's an ontological argument commonly attributed to Descartes (but perhaps without textual evidence, since this is a bit different than the argument above?):

1. God is an all-perfect being.
2. An all-perfect being has every perfection (i.e., a great-making quality).
3. Existence is a perfection (i.e., a great-making quality; for something to exist makes it greater than for it not to exist: recall Anselm's "To exist in reality is greater than to exist only as a concept or an idea").

For discussion on Descartes' ontological arguments, see here:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-ontological/

Questions:

Are there reasons to think that any of the premises in these arguments are false?
Are there reasons to think that any of the premises in these arguments assume the conclusion they are supposed to support?
What about Gaunilo's objection that Anselm's argument can be used to "show" the existence of any "perfect" thing whatsoever (e.g., the island which none greater can be conceived, the tattoo needle which none greater can be conceived, etc.), and so is faulty? Are they any good?

2007-09-24T07:40:00.001-07:00

Upon reflection, it seems that the chapter on God should take 2 days, not just 1!
Paper/writing on that due Friday.

Writing & Friday

2007-09-19T11:52:00.000-07:00

Today we talked some about writing. Here are some good things to study and practice from:

Jim Pryor's "Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Paper"
www.jimpryor.net/teaching/guidelines/writing.html

Michael Huemer's "A Guide to Writing"
http://home.earthlink.net/~owl233/writing.htm

Strunk and White's The Elements of Style, especially part III
http://www.bartleby.com/141/

For fun: "Philosophy Paper Pet Peeves" from SUNY Fredonia
http://www.fredonia.edu/philosophy/Default.aspx?tabid=774

For Friday, re-read Sider ch. 3 on time.
Some notes are below.
There is a writing assignment due, which is to explain the arguments from the chapter and evaluate them as sound or unsound. Another way to approach the assignment is to explain what Sider's (personal) views seem to be and what the best objections to them are.

For Monday, you should read at least 2 out of 4 the online encylopedia articles on time. See below.

2007-09-19T04:54:00.000-07:00

Notes on Riddles of Existence Ch. 3: Time

First, for more discussion, see:

Time : http://www.iep.utm.edu/t/time.htm

Time Travel: http://www.iep.utm.edu/t/timetrav.htm

For more advanced discussion, see:

Time: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/

Time Travel & Modern Physics: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time-travel-phys/

Some highly practical, concrete questions:

Could we go back in time? Is this logically possible, or does the very concept of time make this an impossibility/
Can our actions now cause things in the past to be different?

Obviously, these questions depend on the nature of time! But what is time anyway?

The flow of time (p. 44) [The “time moves” theory of time]

We tend to describe time as “moving” (it flows, marches on, flies, etc.)

But movement is defined in terms of time! (p. 45)

The present moment “moves.”

But then the present is defined in terms of other times. (Later, the present will be 6 PM).

Different times are part of hypertime? If so, then hypertime is part of hypertime2 and on and on!

Perhaps then the present moves with respect to itself. (p. 47).

“Noon is present at noon,” etc. Trivial and doesn’t explain how time “moves.”

The space-time theory (of time)

Time is like space. (p. 49)

· Space-time diagrams. See figures!

· Temporal parts= a temporal cross section of that object; that object at that time. (Compare spatial part to temporal part).

Person = sum of temporal parts.

Reality = a single unified space time (vs. the “time moves” theory). (p. 50)

Time does not flow; it is like space. (But only one direction: past to future)

1. Temporally distant objects are still real: past objects exist (??), i.e., they exist somewhere in spacetime. (p. 51), like spatially distant objects are also real.

2. Objects have temporal parts, like spatial objects have spatial parts.

3. Claims about “here” and “now” depend on who is saying them, where she is (in space and time) and what is said.

Arguments against the space-time theory: change, motion, causes (p. 52)

Does time flow? Or is like space?

Space-time doesn’t have the problems (paradoxes?) of flow theory. But there are objections to the space-time theory.

In opposition to (1)-(3) above, one might claim that (p. 53)

· past and future objects do not exist (in spacetime?);

· things do not have temporal parts; at any time the whole object is present,

· “now” is not like “here”: the present moment is special, unlike “here.”

Sider says he’ll skip these objections! (“Time is short!”)

Other objections that time is not like space (p. 53); disanalogies:

1. Regarding change. “Change” vs. “spatial heterogeneity”

2. Regarding motion: can spatially move in many directions; can only go one direction in time.

3. Regarding causes: an event at any place events can cause other events at any other place, but events can’t cause events at just any other time: later events can’t cause earlier events. The past isfixed.

Replies to these objections, these claims about disanalogy (p. 54).

· To objection 2, see 54-57 for the details. How’s this work?

· To objection 3 “most challenging and interesting”, see p. 57.

§ Could there be backwards causation? Could we cause ourselves to be present in the past (i.e., travel through time?). Is this logically possible?

· If time is like space, then perhaps!

Time Travel: (p. 58)

“Back to the Future”

“First, McFly pushes the button in 1985 and then he is in 1955.”

· Story is contradictory. If contradictory, then impossible. Can a time travel story be told without contradiction?

o Eliminate that contradiction by appealing to McFly’s experience.

· Could McFly prevent himself from ever existing? (Another worry: Time travel to kill earlier self?!)

2007-09-14T07:02:00.000-07:00

For Monday, re-read Conee on Fatalism (see argument notes below).

NEW: read the Stanford Encyclopedia article on Fatalism online at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fatalism . I gave out copies to people in class; those who missed need to print out their own copy.

2007-09-14T07:01:00.000-07:00

The Arguments on Fatalism: Riddles Ch. 2

What fatalism is: ________________________________________________________

Below are valid arguments: the reasoning is fine.

Are they sound? What can be said for and against the premises? Are any of the premises unreasonable to accept because there are good reasons to think they are false?

Arguments from Predications and (Past) Propositions: The Sea Battle

A1. Either the prediction that the battle will happen is true, or the prediction that the battle will not happen is true. (Or, either of the propositions is true).

Why? LEM (p. 27). Objections re. settled facts and future truth makers.

Doubts from vagueness!

A2. If any statement is true, then it has to be true.

Ambiguity:

It has to be true that: if any statement is true, then it’s true.

If any statement is true, then it has to be true.

C1. Whatever predication (or proposition) is true has to be true.

C2. Whether the battle will happen or not is necessary.

Same argument can be given about every event.

Past Predications

A1. For any way that things will be in the future, there existed in the past a true proposition to the effect that things would be that way. (p. 32).

A2. Every aspect of the past is accidentally necessary, i.e., ________________.

C1. The truth in the past of each true predictive proposition is accidentally necessary.

C2. Therefore, the future in every detail is accidentally necessary.

Necessary Conditions (p. 35)

A1. If something has/is an open alternative/possibility, then all that is needed for the alternative to exist is present. (Something is fixed/unalterable/not an open alternative/possibility if any necessary condition for not having the thing is absent).

A2. Any condition is a necessary condition for itself.

C. Therefore, all actual entities, events and circumstances – past, present and future – are fixed and unalterable down to the last detail.

God Knows (p. 39)

A1. If God knows everything, then God knows in advance (or in eternity) all truths about the whole future.

A2. If God knows any given truth about the future, then any potential for that truth to be untrue would be a potential for God to be mistaken about it.

A3. It’s impossible for God to be mistaken about anything.

C. If God knows everything, then the whole future is fixed and unalterable.

2007-09-14T04:59:00.001-07:00

Annual Southern Appalachian Undergraduate Philosophy Conference

University of North Carolina at Asheville

Sponsored by: UNCA's Philosophical Society and Phi Sigma Tau Chapter

CALL FOR PAPERS

10th Annual
Southern Appalachian Undergraduate Philosophy Conference
The University of North Carolina at Asheville
The Liberal Arts Campus of the University of North Carolina

Saturday, November 3, 2007

Our symposium provides a professional style philosophical forum for aspiring undergraduates to present significant and original work. All papers will be evaluated by blind review process. At the conference, a judge from a university with important graduate program will determine the top three presentations.

Please submit:
• A computer file of the paper in MS Word (papers accepted for the conference will be posted on the web); and
• two copies of each of the following: the paper, an abstract, and a separate cover sheet

Papers on any philosophical topic are welcome. Papers should be designed for a 20 minute presentation time [approximately 10 pages]. The papers should not contain the author’s name or institutional affiliation, since they will be evaluated by a blind review.
Eligibility: any undergraduate student who does not have an undergraduate degree prior to May 1, 2008.
Abstracts should be one paragraph, double spaced, no more than 150 words, and attached to the paper. These abstracts should not contain the author’s name or institutional affiliation, since they will be evaluated in a blind review process.
Cover sheets should be on a separate sheet and contain the title of the paper, the author’s name, institutional affiliation, address, e-mail address, and phone number.

All submissions must be postmarked by Monday, September 24 2007
Acceptance notification will occur by October 15, 2007.

For submissions or further information, please contact:
Dr. Keya Maitra
Department of Philosophy/CPO # 2830, UNCA
One University Heights
Asheville, NC 28804-8505
kmaitra@unca.edu

UNDERGRADUATE PHILOSOPHY CONFERENCE

WILL BE SATURDAY, Nov. 3, 2007

ALL SUBMISSIONS MUST BE POSTMARKED BY

Sep. 24, 2007

Return to Undergraduate Philosophy Conference page

2007-09-12T08:34:00.000-07:00

For Friday, re-read Conee's chapter on fatalism. There is a writing assignment that was announced in class.

Today we wound up talking about this topic in thinking about the First Assumption of the sea battle argument (p. 24) and LEM (p. 27).

Vagueness

First published Sat Feb 8, 1997; substantive revision Tue Aug 29, 2006

There is wide agreement that a term is vague to the extent that it has borderline cases. This makes the notion of a borderline case crucial in accounts of vagueness. I shall concentrate on an historical characterization of borderline cases that most commentators would accept. Vagueness will then be contrasted with ambiguity and generality. This will clarify the nature of the philosophical challenge posed by vagueness. I will then discuss some rival theories of vagueness with an emphasis on many-valued logic, supervaluationism and contextualism. I will conclude with the issue of whether all vagueness is linguistic.

2007-09-10T11:06:00.001-07:00

Wed & Friday:

Riddles, Ch. 2 on Fate

Writing assignment on this chapter, due Friday.

See this: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fatalism/

Fatalism

First published Wed Dec 18, 2002; substantive revision Tue Oct 10, 2006

Fatalism is the view that we are powerless to do anything other than what we actually do. It may be argued for in various ways: by appeal to logical laws and metaphysical necessities; by appeal to the existence and nature of God; by appeal to causal determinism. When argued for in the first way, it is commonly called "Logical fatalism" (or, in some cases, "Metaphysical fatalism"); when argued for in the second way, it is commonly called "Theological fatalism". When argued for in the third way it is not now commonly referred to as "fatalism" at all, and such arguments will not be discussed here.

The interest in arguments for fatalism lies at least as much in the question of how the conclusion may be avoided as in the question of whether it is true.

2007-09-07T13:06:00.001-07:00

For Monday, read Schechtman in Reading Metaphysics and answer the questions in the commentary.

The selections in Reading Metaphysics take a long time to read carefully. Read their introduction to understand why.

MARYA SCHECHTMAN

Department of Philosophy, M/C 267
1404 University Hall
University of Illinois at Chicago
Chicago, IL 60607

tel: (312) 413-7565
fax: (312) 413-2093
e-mail
Curriculum Vitae

Marya Schechtman is an Associate Professor. She received her Ph.D. from Harvard in 1988. Her main areas of interest are personal identity, practical reason, and the philosophy of mind. Her book, The Constitution of Selves, argues that contemporary metaphysical discussions of personal identity over time fail to distinguish between two distinct but related questions, one having to do with re-identifying persons and the other with determining the essential features of character, value, and commitment that make a person who she is. She has continued her research in this area, and is currently working on a project investigating the relations between the sense of "identity" at stake in metaphysical discussions of personal identity and that at issue in the work of value theorists. She is also interested in questions of autonomy, the philosophy of psychology, and existentialism. She is a member of UIC's Laboratory of Integrated Neuroscience, and has published several articles on topics concerning personal identity and the philosophy of mind, including "Personhood and Personal Identity" (Journal of Philosophy, 1990), "The Same and the Same" (American Philosophical Quarterly, 1994),"The Brain/Body Problem" (Philosophical Psychology, 1997), "Empathetic Access: The Missing Ingredient in Personal Identity" (Philosophical Explorations, May 2001).

2007-09-07T12:34:00.001-07:00

Brief Notes on Parfit’s “Personal Identity” in Reading Metaphysics

Introduction, p. 13

He’s going to be discussing two beliefs:

1. That questions about personal identity must (always) have an answer.

a. E.g., “Is A=B?” or “Am I identical to this future person?” Parfit will argue that there are cases where, presumably, there is no answer, i.e., “yes” and “no” are both incorrect.

(Later, however, on p. 17, he suggests that he means to say that we can’t at all tell or identify the answer; this epistemological skepticism is less radical than the claim above).

b. He can only give a case to make this assumption above “implausible” (p. 14).

c. If this – a – is so, then the principle of self-interest isn’t so important. And aging and death aren’t so depressing (p. 14). (Why?)

2. That personal identity is “important” (for “survival,” memory and responsibility.

a. These concerns can be addressed without identity.

[informative labels for section headings are always nice; too bad he didn’t give them!]

Case of a man dividing like an amoeba

Wiggins case: your brain is divided and each half housed in a new living body. What happens to you?

1. You don’t survive. NO.

2. You survive as one. (which?) NO

3. You survive as both.

a. If survival implies identity, then you are two different people.

b. Usually this is thought to be impossible. Parfit suggests however, that you could be two bodies with a divided mind. (p. 15)

Description of a “full” and then “divided” (and then re-united) stream of consciousness. (p. 16). Thus, two bodies and a divided mind, one person.

If permanent division, hard(er) to speak of one person. (p. 17)

c. Parfit’s (positive) suggestion: you survive as two different people but are not identical to them (and they are not identical to you). (p. 17). (And nothing important requires identity).

Parfit thinks this case suggests that belief (1 above is false, so questions about personal identity do not (always) have an answer.

II.

Survival needs not be “one-one” (but identity must be “one-one,” i.e., one person identical to one and only one person; that’s why in branching cases, there is no identity).
Identity doesn’t come in degrees: either identical or not, all or nothing.
What matters for survival are relations of degree.
What matters for survival doesn’t presuppose identity (according to Parfit).
Psychological continuity is what’s really of interest, not necessarily identity..
Non-branching psychological continuity is identity which is one-to-one. (p. 21)

III Q-Memory

Memory presupposes personal identity: if you genuinely remember doing X, then you are identical to the person who did X.

[Problem: circularity! (p24) So, Parfit is going to try to analyze survival / personal identity in terms of psychological relations that do not presuppose identity]

S “q-remembers” experience X = (p. 22)

(1) S believes that he experienced X; it seems to him that he experienced X;

(2) someone did have such an experience;

(3) S’s belief that S experienced X is dependent on that experience in the same way that a genuine memory of an experience is dependent on that experience.

[??????? P. 23 ] See Parfit’s explanation…

IV Psychological Continuity and Connectedness

Connectedness = direct psychological relations (p. 25)

More important

Continuity = psychological overlap (p.26)

These relations come in degrees. More and less connectedness…

V Consequences of Psychological Continuity and Connectedness

Connectedness = “one of my future selves,” “one of my past selves”

Does not imply identity (p. 27)

“I”= the greatest degree of psychological connectedness. (p. 28).

“Not me who did that, but an earlier self” !! (But that self is not identical to me or previous selves)

“There is no underlining person who we . . are.” (p. 29)

VI Some practical consequences

· The principle of self-interest: do what’s in your best self interest. (p. 29)

“has no force” according to Parfit (because of lack of identity)

· The principle of biased rationality: do what will best achieve what you want.

· The principle of impartiality: do what’s in the interests of everyone concerned.

Suppose someone didn’t care about his future: he wouldn’t care about the principle of self-interest. The principle of impartiality would still apply.

Fear of death…

For Friday

2007-09-05T07:01:00.000-07:00

For Friday, re-read Parfit in Reading Metaphysics and answer the questions in the commentary.

For Monday, read Schechtman in Reading Metaphysics and answer the questions in the commentary.

The selections in Reading Metaphysics take a long time to read carefully. Read their introduction to understand why.

No late questions will be accepted. It is vitally important that you do the reading and do the reading on time. See the syllabus.

2007-08-31T08:05:00.000-07:00

No class Monday.

For Wed., we need to quickly finish discussion of Riddles Ch. 1.
For Wed. Read Parfit in Reading Metaphysics and answer the questions in the commentary.

For Monday, read Schechtman in Reading Metaphysics and answer the questions in the commentary.

The selections in Reading Metaphysics take a long time to read carefully. Read their introduction to understand why.

2007-08-31T08:03:00.000-07:00

Personal Identity

2007-08-31T07:44:00.001-07:00

Notes on Riddles of Existence, Ch. 1, Personal Identity

The question: what makes persons numerically the same over time (if they are)?
Numerical sameness vs. qualitative sameness: we aren’t qualitatively the same at all times, yet we are numerically the same (or are we not?).

Some concrete reasons to be interested: regret, anticipation, just punishment, and life-after-death seem to make sense only on the assumption that that was me who did that or that will be me in the future.

“Same matter” theory:
Necessarily , a person A (at T1) is numerically identical to person B (at T2) if, and only if A & B are composed of the same matter.

Objections:
1. If the “same matter” theory is true, then you = the Greek statesman.
2. But you ≠ the statesman.
3. Therefore, the same matter theory is not true. (Modus tollens)

4. If the “same matter” theory is true, then you-NOW ≠ you-5MINUTES AGO.
5. But youNOW = you-5MINUTES AGO.
6. Therefore, the same matter theory is not true. (Modus tollens)

The Soul theory:
Necessarily, a person A (at T1) is numerically identical to person B (at T2) if, and only if A & B have the same soul.

A soul= ? (Non-physical entity that enables thought and feeling).
Sider’s responses: no good reason to believe there are souls. Brains are a better explanation for human thought and feeling.
1. If it is reasonable to believe the soul theory of personal identity, then it is reasonable to believe that there are souls.
2. But it is not reasonable to believe there are souls.
3. So the soul theory is not reasonable to believe.

Another problem:
A & B have the same soul if and only if__?___.
• At the very least, it’s not clear how one could tell this. If this would be known by observation of bodies, brains, and/or psychological matters (i.e., the personality), etc. then it would seem that those factors are what makes for personal identity: the soul would seem to be a “3rd wheel”.
• Further problems if souls have parts that they lose and gain: the problem of soul identity again. This is to dig our hole deeper.

Spaciotemporal (space-time) continuity theory:
Necessarily, a person A (at T1) is numerically identical to person B (at T2) if, and only if A & B are spaciotemporally continuous (and chances between members in the series are gradual, caused by the previous member …. )

Objection from Locke’s case of the Prince and the Cobbler:
1. If the Spaciotemporal (space-time) continuity theory is true, then the person in the prince’s body is really the prince, not the cobbler.
2. But the cobbler is in the prince’s body!
3. So the Spaciotemporal (space-time) continuity theory is not true.

The problem: the space-time theory focuses only on bodies. Locke’s suggestion is that personal identity depends on psychologies.

Psychological continuity theory (mental life=personalities, memories, character traits, etc.):
Necessarily, a person A (at T1) is numerically identical to person B (at T2) if, and only if A & B are psychologically continuous (and chances between members in the series are gradual, caused by the previous member …. ).

Charles and Guy Fawkes objection (from Bernard Williams, a famous philosopher):
Case: Both Charles and Robert (in 2007) have Guy Fawkes’ (1906) psychology.

Objection 1: The Duplication Problem (see also Parfit’s Teletransporter case)
1. If the Psychological continuity theory is true, then Charles = Fawkes and Robert = Fawkes.
2. But if Charles = Fawkes and Robert = Fawkes, then Charles=Robert!
3. But Charles ≠ Robert!
4. So, it’s not the case that: Charles = Fawkes and Robert = Fawkes
5. So the psychological continuity theory is not true.

Objection 2: The Circularity Objection [from Reading Metaphysics]
6. If the Psychological continuity theory is true, then Charles = Fawkes if and only if Charles has Fawkes’ memories, experiences, etc.
7. But Charles has Fawkes’ memories, experiences, etc. (i.e., he doesn’t just think he has these, or imagine having them) only if Charles = Fawkes!!
Moral: there is memory only with identity. So appealing to memory doesn’t help identify the essence of personal identity.

Back to Spaciotemporal (space-time) continuity theory:

How much Spaciotemporal change (to your body) can happen but you remain?

Duplication problem again:
Case: your body and brain are split down the middle. Each half is “rebuilt.” Each is spacio-temporally continuous with you.
If each = you, then each is identical to each other. But each isn’t identical to each other (suppose one is shipped to Japan, the other to Alaska). So each isn’t identical to you.

Problem: both theories have trouble with branching or duplication cases.
• An interesting fact: if there’s no branching, then there’s identity. If there is branching, then there is no identity!

Radical Solutions to the Problem of Duplication:

• Parfit: Being numerically identical to persons “before” and “in front of you” in time is not important!
• What’s important is psychological continuity. (Apply this to the cases above).

2007-08-27T06:55:00.001-07:00

Today I gave out a logic and argument handout .

Writing assignment for Friday, based on Riddles, Ch. 1.

1. What is the question or issue of personal identity?
2. What are the main positions taken on the issue?
3. What are the strengths and weaknesses of each position?
4. Which position (if any) is best? Why?

2007-08-24T07:59:00.000-07:00

Time on Trial: One Hundred Years of McTaggart's Argument against Time
Morgantown, West Virginia
25 - 26 April, 2007

West Virginia University's Department of Philosophy is pleased to announce a major conference April 25 and 26, 2008 in Morgantown. "Time on Trial: One Hundred Years of McTaggart's Argument against Time" will celebrate a century of the reception of McTaggart's (in)famous argument that time does not exist. We are pleased to have three outstanding keynote speakers: L. Nathan Oaklander, Quentin Smith and Michael Tooley.

We are seeking quality submissions: 3,000 word papers in blind review format on any topic related to McTaggart's argument or its reception. They should be emailed to:

ernani.magalhaes@mail.wvu.edu

by November 1.

Those accepted will be reimbursed for one day of their lodging expenses.

Undergraduate students with an interest in the topic are also encouraged to submit relevant papers. One presentation slot has been reserved for a qualifying undergraduate submission. Papers should be in the same format and sent to the email address above. The undergraduate presenter will receive a stipend of $100. Please note if yours is an undergraduate submission.

Department of Philosophy

For Monday

2007-08-24T05:50:00.000-07:00

Additional reading for Monday:

Jim Pryor's Guidelines on Reading Philosophy
Philosophical Terms and Methods

All at http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching

Previously posted assignments:

FIRST ASSIGNMENTS:

The first writing assignment is to reflectively develop and defend answers to these questions: what is philosophy? What is it to think philosophically? How does one think philosophically? What is it to be a philosopher? What is the value in thinking philosophically and/or being a philosopher? Are there any risks to thinking philosophically and/or being a philosopher? Due Monday 8/27.
The first reading assignment is Riddles, Ch. 1. and the Introduction of Reading Metaphysics. Due Monday 8/27.
ASAP email the instructor at aphilosopher@gmail.com to let him know that you are going to be in this class. The email should say which class you are, your name, your major and ask a question or give a comment about the class so far. This will help the instructor make an email list for the class.

Syllabus

2007-08-22T08:17:00.000-07:00

Course: Metaphysics - 42150 - HPHI 475A - 01

Course web page: http://MorehouseMetaphysics.blogspot.com

Syllabus @ http://aphilosopher.googlepages.com/metaphysics-syl.doc

Days: MWF.

Time: 9 AM currently; perhaps will change to 10, 11, or later

Place: depending on the size of the class, hopefully we can find a seminar room for a better learning environment.

Instructor: Dr. Nathan Nobis (nnobis@morehouse.edu, aphilosopher@gmail.com)

Office: Philosophy & Religion Department, Sale Hall 113

Office Hours: 10-12 MWF and by appointment (but please let me know if you want to meet)

In this course, we will survey the range of answers to challenging philosophical questions in metaphysics, including:

How is that you are the same individual you were last week, or when you were 10 (or 5, or 1, or birth, or before..?), given all the changes that have occurred to you? What makes a person the same person over time, despite such drastic changes?
It seems that everything that happens has a cause (whether we know what it is or not). But if everything is caused, and so our actions are caused, then can we have free will?
Two red things have something in common, namely that they are red. But what is this “redness”? Is it a thing of some kind? Or is this just a way we talk about things?

Other issues concern whether anything is fated; the nature of time (and time travel); whether God exists; why anything exists; the relation between objects and their parts; the nature of possibility and necessity; the challenging (and peculiar) question, “What is metaphysics anyway?” and more.

All the issues in this class are extremely intellectually challenging. These are hard philosophical problems and require a lot of careful and critical thinking. The challenge, however, can reap great rewards!:)

Required Books: (Many are available used – and often cheaper – online at Amazon.com, AbeBooks.com, etc.)

Our main two texts that we will read first:

1. Riddles of Existence by Ted Sider and Earl Conee (Oxford). The first chapter is available here: http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/sider/riddles/riddles.html

2. Reading Metaphysics: Selective Texts with Interactive Commentary (Blackwell) by Julian Dodd and Helen Beebee.

We will then revisit free will and related issues:

3. A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, by Robert Kane (Oxford)

And then revisit personal identity and related issues:
4. A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality, by John Perry (Hackett)

Finally, we will investigate the possible relevance of metaphysics to ethics/bioethics:
5. Bioethics and Human Identity by David DeGrazia (Cambridge).

Grading:

Midterm Exam 25 percent

Final Exam 25 percent

Argumentative Research Paper 25 percent

Readings Homework and Presentations 25 percent

Attendance variable impact

Basic Responsibilities:

Always do the readings. Do them carefully, in the proper (quiet, distraction-free) environment and with adequate time given to them. Come to class so we can have an informed, responsible and intelligent discussion of them and the issues they raise. Always bring the assigned and have them out since we cannot do anything without them: much of our class time will be spent reading the texts and discussing them very carefully.
Chronic tardiness to class will not be tolerated. Certainly, sometimes circumstances cause one to be late for class but these times should be the exception. Students who cannot make it to class on time are encouraged to change their habits or drop the course. If you do come in late, please do so in a quiet manner so that you do not disrupt class.
Attendance and participation are mandatory. After three unexcused absences, your final grade for the class will be lowered by one letter grade. Subsequent unexcused absences will continue to lower your final grade at the same rate. Each class period a sign-in sheet will be passed around to take role. It is your responsibility to sign it. If your name is not on the sheet, then you will be counted absent for that day.
Distractions are prohibited. No using cell phones, PDA’s, Sidekicks, text messaging, listening to music on headphones, reading a newspaper or doing work for other classes. Computers can only be used for taking notes and other class-related work, not web surfing. Anyone using such devices for unacceptable purposes, doing work for other classes and is otherwise disengaged or disruptive will be asked to leave.
No eating in class.
“Help me help you”: The instructor should be informed of medical, family, or other problems that necessitate missing class or that interfere with your work. In addition, students are encouraged to visit with the instructor during his office hours if they are having difficulty reading or understanding the materials presented in class. If you ever have any questions about anything, please just ask!

A WARNING ABOUT PLAGIARISM:

“The Division of Humanities & Social Sciences at Morehouue College endorses the highest standards and expectations of academic honesty and integrity. Plagiarism or any other form of academic dishonesty will not be tolerated. Sanctions for violation of these standards include possible suspension or dismissal from the College. It is each student’s responsibility to be familiar with the expected codes of conduct as outlined in the College Catalogue and Student Handbook.”

Cheating and plagiarism are forms of lying (to the instructor, the school, future teachers and employers, and yourself, among others) and theft (of other people’s ideas and words) and are grounds for failing the course. If you submit a plagiarized paper (e.g., a paper you took in whole or in part from the internet or some other illegitimate source), the instructor (with the help of Turnitin.com) will notice this and you will then fail this course immediately: no excuses will be accepted. It is your responsibility to know what plagiarism is.
Here are some suggestions to avoid plagiarism: do not check the internet for anything related to your papers: instead use the texts required for the course and think for yourself; do not take phrases from the texts; put all of your writings in your own words; do not cut and paste anything from the internet into your paper; do not visit Wikipedia; do not take articles from online encyclopedias; do not visit online dictionaries; use an acceptable citation method (e.g., MLA, APA, etc.), which you learned to do in Introductory English courses. If you would like additional sources to learn more about a topic, see the instructor.

READING SCHEDULE AND ASSIGNMENTS

FIRST ASSIGNMENTS:

The first writing assignment is to reflectively develop and defend answers to these questions: what is philosophy? What is it to think philosophically? How does one think philosophically? What is it to be a philosopher? What is the value in thinking philosophically and/or being a philosopher? Are there any risks to thinking philosophically and/or being a philosopher? Due Monday 8/27.
The first reading assignment is Riddles, Ch. 1. and the Introduction of Reading Metaphysics. Due Monday 8/27.
ASAP email the instructor at aphilosopher@gmail.com to let him know that you are going to be in this class. The email should say which class you are, your name, your major and ask a question or give a comment about the class so far. This will help the instructor make an email list for the class.

The tentative order of readings is below. The exact schedule of readings will be announced in class; our rate of progress depends on the nature of our discussions.

Additional materials and assignments will be announced or given out in class. Since this class will be conducted in seminar style using the Socratic Method, specific reading assignment dates will be adjusted throughout the semester to allow for discussion of issues that may take more class time. If you have any questions about your reading assignment, please do not hesitate to ask the instructor for clarification. Please bring your books to class since we will read important passages together and sometimes read selections that were not included in that day’s assignment.

RIDDLES: CH 1 PERSONAL IDENTITY

READING METAPHYSICS: Ch. 1 Personal Identity
Introduction
Derek Parfit, 'Personal Identity'
Commentary on Parfit
Marya Schechtman, 'Personhood and Personal Identity'
Commentary on Schechtman
Further Reading
Essay Questions

RIDDLES: CH. 2: FATALISM

RIDDLES: CH. 3: TIME

RIDDLES: CH. 4: GOD

RIDDLES: CH. 5: WHY NOT NOTHING?

RIDDLES: CH. 6: FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM

READING METAPHYSICS Ch. 2 Free Will
Introduction
Peter van Inwagen, 'The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism'
Commentary on van Inwagen
Daniel Dennett, 'Could Have Done Otherwise' (extract from Elbow Room)
Commentary on Dennett
Further Reading
Essay Questions
Appendix

RIDDLES CH. 7: CONSTITUTION

READING METAPHYSICS Ch. 6 Persistence over Time
Introduction
David Lewis, extract from On the Plurality of Worlds
Commentary on Lewis
Sally Haslanger, 'Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics'
Commentary on Haslanger
David Lewis, 'Tensing the Copula'
Commentary on Lewis
Further reading
Essay questions

RIDDLES CH. 8. UNIVERSALS

READING METAPHYSICS Ch. 4 Realism and Nominalism
Introduction
Michael Devitt, '"Ostrich Nominalism" or "Mirage Realism"?'
Commentary on Devitt
D. M. Armstrong, 'Against "Ostrich" Nominalism: A Reply to Michael Devitt'
Commentary on Armstrong
Further reading
Essay questions

RIDDLES CH. 9. POSSIBILITY AND NECESSITY

READING METAPHYSICS Ch. 5 Possible Worlds
Introduction
David Lewis, extract from Counterfactuals
Commentary on Lewis
Saul Kripke, extract from Naming and Necessity
Commentary on Kripke
Further reading
Essay questions

READING METAPHYSICS Ch. 3 Realism and Anti-realism
Introduction
Donald Davidson, 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme'
Commentary on Davidson
Thomas Nagel, 'Thought and Reality' (extract from The View from Nowhere)
Commentary on Nagel
Further reading
Essay questions

RIDDLES CH. 10. WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?

Next, revisit free will and related issues: A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, by Robert Kane (Oxford)

Next, revisit free will and related issues: A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality, by John Perry (Hackett)

Finally, investigate the possible relevance of metaphysics to ethics/bioethics: Bioethics and Human Identity by David DeGrazia (Cambridge).

	1	2	3	4	5
It should be given to the person with brown hair.
It should be given to the person with blonde hair.
It should be given to neither.
It should be split between the two.

	1	2	3	4	5
It should be given to the person on Earth.
It should be given to the person on the space station.
It should be given to neither.
It should be split between the two.

Morehouse Metaphysics

Notes

Study Guide

next week

Wed. & Friday

For Friday and Monday, next week

Philosophical survey

COURSE DESCRIPTION:

ATTENDANCE REGULATIONS:

Reworking metaphysics papers for conference submission

On Bullshit

Writing & Friday

For Friday, re-read Conee's chapter on fatalism. There is a writing assignment that was announced in class.

Vagueness

Fatalism

For Friday

Personal Identity

Related Entries

For Monday

Syllabus